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Abstract: This	paper	draws	attention	to	the	role	of	new	actors,	norms	and	processes	in	global	 governance.		 Specifically,	 it	 examines	 the	 Oyu	 Tolgoi	 copper	 and	 gold	mine	 in	Mongolia	and	the	role	played	by	weak	domestic	laws	on	land	and	indigenous	rights	as	crucial	for	understanding	the	entry	of	new	‘legal’	actors,	‘rights’	and	‘remedies’	into	the	legal	 landscape	 on	 land	 and	 global	 governance.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 struggles	 of	 nomadic	pastoralist	resettled	to	make	way	for	the	mine,	I	expose	the	relevance	of	project	finance	structures,	 informal	 land	policies,	'soft'	 grievance	mechanisms	connecting	 investors	 to	communities	and	 a	 nascent	 trend	 seeing	 financial	 institutions	committed	 to	 the	financing	 of	 the	 project	 factually	 determine	 issues	 of	 ‘indigenous’	 identity	 and	 legal	status.		Through	 this	 case	 I	 hope	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 a	 larger	 pattern	 of	 ‘real	world’	developments	connected	to	the	changing	role	of	the	state,	the	related	emergence	of	new	actors,	norms	and	processes	in	modern	processes	of	globalisation	and	financialization,	and	the	effect	of	the	same	on	the	rights	of	affected	communities.							
Keywords:	 'Actors,	 norms,	 processes',	 Mongolia,	 indigenous	 land	 rights,	 financial	investors,	sovereignty.  	
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New	‘Legal’	Actors,	Norms	And	Processes:	Formal	And	
Informal	Indigenous	Land	Rights	Norms	In	The	Oyu	
Tolgoi	Project,	Mongolia1	
	 Kinnari	Bhatt2			
1. The	Oyu	Tolgoi	Project:	Mapping	New	Actors,	Norms	and	Processes	
	The	inability	of	formal	Mongolian	law	to	provide	legal	protection	to	pastoralist	herders	displaced	from	their	traditional	lands	has,	this	paper	will	argue,	led	to	the	entry	of	new	legal	actors,	 ‘rights’	and	‘remedies’	into	the	legal	landscape	concerning	land	and	global	governance.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 specific	 struggles	 of	 nomadic	 pastoralist	 herders	 in	Mongolia	 the	 paper	 shines	 light	 on	 a	 larger	 pattern	 of	 ‘real	 world’	 developments	connected	to	the	changing	role	of	the	state	and	the	emergence	and	implications	of	new	actors,	norms	and	processes3	in	global	legal	contexts.		
	The	Oyu	Tolgoi	project	is	a	$12	billion	investment	to	develop	a	copper	and	gold	mine	at	Oyu	 Tolgoi	 in	 the	 Southern	 Gobi	 region	 (the	 ‘OT	 Project’).	 In	 2004,	 after	 completing	mineral	 exploration	 work	 and	 fencing	 off	 land	 for	 mine	 construction	 eleven	 herding	households	 from	 two	 districts	were,	 following	 initial	 resistance	 and	 threats	 of	 forced	
                                       1	 Conference	 and	 working	 paper	 delivered	 at	 the	 6th	 Conference	 of	 the	 Postgraduate	 and	 Early	Professionals/Academics	 Network	 of	 the	 Society	 of	 International	 Economic	 Law	 (PEPA/SIEL)	 2017	 in	Tilburg,	the	Netherlands,	20-21	April	2017.	Thank	you	to	Phillip	Paiement	Assistant	Professor	at	Tilburg	University	and	Mislav	Mataija	from	the	European	Commission,	Legal	Services	for	comments	on	this	paper.		2	 I	 am	 a	 Visiting	 Fellow	 at	 the	 Transnational	 Law	 Institute,	 King’s	 College	 London,	 The	 Dickson	 Poon	School	 of	 Law	 and	 an	 English	 qualified	 solicitor	 (LLB	 Law	 with	 French	 (Birmingham),	 M.Sc.,	 PhD)	experienced	 in	 the	 project	 financing	 and	 legal	 and	 regulatory	 reform	 of	 natural	 resource	 projects.	 I	worked	at	White	and	Case	LLP	and	Milbank	Tweed,	Hadley	&	McCloy	LLP.	I	served	as	legal	advisor	to	the	Ministry	 of	 Mineral	 Resources	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 in	 a	 World	 Bank/DFID	 funded	 mining	 environmental,	health	 and	 social	 regulatory	 drafting	 project	 and	 as	 civil	 society	 advisor	 to	 the	 Natural	 Resource	Governance	Institute	on	the	Guinean	Mining	Code.			3	 Inspiration	 for	 the	methodology	 and	 title	 for	 this	 work	 come	 from	 P	 Zumbansen’s	 ‘actor,	 norm	 and	process’	framework.	See	P	Zumbansen,	'Lochner	Disembedded:	The	Anxieties	of	Law	in	a	Global	Context'	(2013)	 20	 Indiana	 Journal	 of	 Global	 Legal	 Studies	 29	 and	 Zumbansen,	 Peer.	 "Defining	 the	 Space	 of	Transnational	 Law:	 Legal	 Theory,	 Global	 Governance,	 and	 Legal	 Pluralism”,	 (2012)	 21	 2	 Transnational	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	305-336.	
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eviction	from	the	local	government,	relocated	to	make	may	for	the	project.4	In	2012	and	2013,	relocated	herders	organised	into	the	Gobi	Soil	NGO	and	submitted	two	complaints	concerning	 the	 project	 to	 an	 investor	 in	 the	 project:	 the	 International	 Finance	Corporation	(IFC),	through	its	Complaints	Advisory	Ombudsman.		The	complaints	detail	how	 89	 herder	 households,	 reliant	 on	 traditional	 livestock	 systems	 like	 winter	 and	summer	 camps5	 were	 resettled	 using	 private	 informal	 land	 resettlement	 policies	without	adequate	compensation.	Herders	self-identify	as	Indigenous	people6	practising	nomadic	 lifestyle	 and	 culture	 and	 with	 sacred	 relations	 with	 water	 sources	 like	 the	Undai	 River	 and	 thus	 claim	 a	 right	 to	 claim	 land	 access.	 The	 Mongolian	 state	 as	discussed	 in	more	 detail	 later,	 does	 not	 acknowledge	 the	 herders’	 indigenous	 status,	leading	to	a	situation	in	which	financial	investors	are	becoming	increasingly	drawn	into	conversations	surrounding	the	factual	demarcation	of	indigenous	status.					
2. Weak	National	Laws	creating	‘Policy’	Space		
	The	government	of	Mongolia	(GoM)	has	ratified	an	impressive	number	of	international	legal	instruments.	These	include	the	International	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	all	Forms	of	Racial	Discrimination,	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	with	its	protection	of	property	rights	and	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	pursuant	to	which	the	state	guarantees	to	right	to	an	adequate	standard	
                                       4	 See	 Oyu	 Tolgoi	 Complaint	 No.	 1	 dated	 12th	 October	 2012,	 <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-links/documents/OyuTolgoiCAOComplaint_Oct122012_Redacted.pdf.>	accessed	18	November	2016.	5	As	 stated	 in	 the	2012	complaint,	 for	herders,	winter	 camps	have	central	 significance	given	 the	 length	and	 severity	 of	winter	 in	Mongolia.	 Traditional	 livelihoods	 also	 rely	 on	 availability	 on	pasture,	 reserve	pastures	and	water	wells	which	herders	also	 lost	 access	 to:	 see	Oyu	Tolgoi	Complaint	No.	1	dated	12th	October	2012.	Traditional	 livelihoods	 also	 rely	 on	 availability	 on	 pasture,	 reserve	 pastures	 and	 water	 wells	 which	herders	also	lost	access	to		6	 The	 complaint	 states	 that	 ‘we	 are	 Indigenous	 people	who	practice	 nomadic	 lifestyle	 and	 culture,	 and	make	 livings	 from	herding	 livestock	 that	are	heavily	reliant	on	pastureland	yields	and	capacity.	We	are	legitimate	owners	of	 the	pastureland	with	historical	 rights	 supported	by	 traditional	 customs.	However,	the	 company	does	 not	 accept	 it,	 yet	 it	 provided	no	 justification	 to	 further	 their	 position.	 The	 company	thinks	 we	 are	 not	 ethnic	 minorities	 so	 that	 we	 have	 no	 right	 to	 claim	 land	 access.	 Pasture	 rights	 are	essential	 to	 support	 nomadic	 lifestyle	 and	 livelihoods	 infrastructure,	 but	 violations	 of	 pasture	 rights	protection	 lead	 to	 collapse	 of	 traditional	 lifestyle	 based	 on	 pastoral	 nomadism’,	 taken	 from	 Second	Complaint	of	herder	groups	resettled	in	the	Oyu	Tolgoi	Project	dated	February	11,	2013.	
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of	living	and	adequate	food7.	Mongolia	is	also	one	of	very	few	states	to	have	ratified	the	Optional	Protocol	to	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	(Optional	 Protocol)	 and	 consequently	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 UN	 Committee	 on	 Economic	Social	and	Cultural	Rights’	recommendation	processes.	Article	10	of	the	1992	Mongolian	Constitution	directly	incorporates	these	treaties	into	domestic	law8.	However,	as	I	will	now	 argue,	 the	 meaningful	 implementation	 of	 these	 treaty	 obligations	 into	 the	Mongolian	 context	 remains	weak	due	 to	 the	 consistent	 pressure	 of	 neoliberal	market	ideology.	This	domestic	legal	weakness	and	aggressive	neoliberal	market	pressure	has,	I	argue,	made	the	practical	involvement	of	financial	investors	and	their	policies	a	crucial	part	 of	 Mongolian	 ‘law	 making’,	 ‘rights’	 and	 ‘enforcement’	 measures.	 A	 pertinent	example	 of	 the	 concretisation	 of	 the	 ‘weakness	 and	pressure’	 narrative	 is	 seen	 in	 the	fact	 that	 Mongolia	 has	 ratified	 the	 United	 Nations	 Declaration	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	Indigenous	Peoples	(UNDRIP)	but	does	not	recognise	pastoralist	groups	as	‘Indigenous’	within	 the	 1992	 Mongolian	 constitution.	 This	 as	 I	 later	 discuss,	 has	 resulted	 in	 an	amazing	 domestic	 legal	 vacuum	 into	 which	 the	 EBRD	 and	 IFC	 are	 now	 drawn	 into	matters	 like	 the	 factual	 demarcation	 of	 herder	 groups	 as	 ‘indigenous’	 or	 ‘vulnerable’,	with	serious	legal	and	social	consequences	for	displaced	herders.		Anthropological	 studies9	 on	 the	 period	 of	 land	 collectivisation	 in	 1940s	 Mongolia	observe	 how	 the	 pastoral	 sector	 was	 organised	 around	 centralised	 collective	 farms	relying	on	portable	housing,	seasonable	movements	to	 fulfil	domestic	and	commercial	needs10.		Traditionally,	local	authorities	accepted	herders’	traditional	rights	to	land	even	though	 they	were	not	 formally	 registered	with	herders	 enjoying	high	 social	 regard	of	
                                       7	Article	11	of	the	ICESCR	protects	the	right	to	an	adequate	standard	of	living,	as	‘the	right	of	everyone	to	an	adequate	standard	of	living	for	himself	and	his	family,	including	adequate	food,	clothing	and	housing,	and	to	the	continuous	improvement	of	living	conditions’.	In	2002	the	CESCR	made	use	of	the	convention’s	flexibility	to	establish	a	right	to	water	within	the	series	of	socio-economic	rights	stating	‘the	right	to	water	clearly	 falls	 within	 the	 category	 of	 guarantees	 essential	 for	 securing	 an	 adequate	 standard	 of	 living,	particularly	 since	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 fundamental	 conditions	 for	 survival’:	 see	 the	 Committee	 on	Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	 Rights,	 General	 Comment	 15,	 the	 right	 to	 water	 (Twenty-ninth	 session,	2003),	U.N.	Doc.	E/C.12/2002/11	(2002)	[3].		8	 For	 example,	 article	 10	 states	 that	 Mongolia	 shall	 adhere	 to	 the	 universally	 recognized	 norms	 and	principles	 of	 international	 law	 and	 pursue	 a	 peaceful	 foreign	 policy	 and	 it	 shall	 fulfil	 in	 good	 faith	 its	obligations	under	international	treaties	to	which	it	is	a	Party.	9	 Sneath	D,	 'Land	Use,	 the	Environment	and	Development	 in	Post-Socialist	Mongolia'	 (2003)	31	Oxford	Development	Studies	441.	10	 Ibid,	 these	 techniques	 included	 portable	 housing	 (the	 ger	 or	 yurt),	 seasonal	 movements	 and	 otor	(foraging	 forays)	which	 fulfilled	both	domestic	subsistence	 livelihood	needs	such	as	meat,	dairy,	winter	clothing	and	transportation	and	yield	focused	or	commercial	needs.	
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their	traditional	animal	husbandry	work11.	Following	the	collapse	of	state	socialism	in	the	1990s	and	economic	advice	from	the	World	Bank	advancing	the	benefits	of	private	land	 ownership	 by	 foreign	 entities,	 the	 GoM	 carried	 out	 political	 economy	 reforms	embracing	 a	 broadly	 liberal	 and	 market	 orientated	 agenda.12	 In	 Mongolia,	 these	Lockean	privatisation	policies	focused	on	unlocking	the	vast	mineral	reserves,	with	the	OT	Project	constituting	one	of	these	transnational	land	policies	in	action.	Such	has	been	the	 success	 of	 privatisation	 policies	 in	 Mongolia	 that	 the	World	 Bank	 estimates	 that	54%	of	Mongolian	 revenues	 derive	 from	mining	 development	 projects.	 	 Related	 legal	reform	followed	and	in	1992,	a	new	constitution	permitted	land,	for	the	first	time,	to	be	held	privately13	as	well	as	a	Land	Law14	codifying	the	constitutional	principle	into	land	laws	that	prioritised	registration	and	titling	of	private	land.			What	followed	were	asocial	policy	recommendations	advocating	privatisation	designed	to	 free	 the	 economy	 from	 inefficient	 state	 control,	 unlock	 agricultural	 value	 and	promote	 tenure	 security.	 For	 example,	 issuance	 of	 certificates	 of	 possession	 to	individuals	 and	 companies	 extending	 long-term	exclusive	 access	 to	 land,	 thus	making	land	open	to	investment.	Given	the	importance	of	winter	pastures	to	herders	in	the	long	and	harsh	Mongolian	winters,	the	government	issued	certificates	of	possession	on	these	lands	 permitting	 herders	 to	 use	 winter	 sites	 for	 sixty	 years	 with	 a	 provision	 for	extension.	 Whilst	 they	 provide	 herders	 the	 right	 to	 negotiate	 with	 developers	 on	compensation	and	resettlement,	failure	to	reach	agreement	results	in	operations	going	ahead.15	 The	 result	 is	 a	 strong	 legal	 framework	 for	 business	 and	 a	 correspondingly	insecure	one	for	customary	rights	holders.		In	the	OT	Project,	this	weak	domestic	legal	protection	has	given	rise	to	the	prevalence	of	new	types	of	policy	based	‘rights’	that	are	 ‘doing	the	work’	of	delinquent	national	 law.	
                                       11	Reference	is	made	to	interviews	and	conversations	with	resettled	herders	(translated	from	Mongolian	to	English	and	on	file	with	the	author).	12	Supra	8.	13	 See	 for	 example	 article	 5	 stating	 that	 the	 land,	 except	 that	 in	 private	 ownership	 of	 the	 citizens	 of	Mongolia,	as	well	as	the	land	subsoil,	forests,	water	resources,	and	fauna	shall	be	the	property	of	the	State.	14	Under	article	30	of	the	2002	Law	of	Mongolia	on	Land	Law	effective	since	1994	and	renewed	in	June	2002,	Mongolian	 citizens,	 business	 entities	 and	 organizations	may	 be	 granted	 the	 right	 to	 lease	 state-owned	land	for	up	to	60	years	with	the	possibility	of	extensions	for	40	years	each.	15	Reference	to	informal	conversations	with	researchers	from	the	University	of	Queensland’s	institute	on	natural	resources	specifically	working	on	Indigenous	issues	in	Mongolia.	Winters	can	last	anywhere	up	to	six	months.	
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The	weakness	of	domestic	 law	on	 land	rights,	 indigenous	peoples	and	resettlement	 in	Mongolia	 means	 that	 private	 investors	 like	 the	 IFC	 and	 European	 Bank	 for	Reconstruction	and	Development	(EBRD)	are	finding	greater	policy	spaces	in	which	to	shape	and	implement	their	own	regulations	and	agenda	on	land	and	indigenous	people	that	can	speak	 to	a	diverse	number	of	 land	connected	groups	 in	geographically	plural	jurisdictions.	The	result	is	the	vocalisation	of	claims	seen	in	the	above	cited	complaints,	in	 which	 herders	 conceptualise	 themselves	 as	 legal	 actors	 despite	 benefitting	 from	formal	 legal	 protection	 as	 ‘Indigenous’.	 Gaps	 in	 domestic	 legal	 protection	means	 that	informal	 land	 and	 indigenous	 policies,	 financial	 ‘project	 finance’	 structures	 through	which	 informal	 norms	 are	 implemented	 and	 non-judicial	 grievance	 mechanisms	 are	rapidly	 becoming	 new	 ‘legal’	 standards	 and	 methods	 of	 adjudication	 through	 which	herders	are	claiming	rights	to	land.				Perhaps,	 the	 obvious	 question	 to	 lawyers	 then,	 is	 perhaps,	 is	 this	 law?	 Should	we	 be	interested	 in	 transnational	 law	 even	 one	 that	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 methodological	
perspective	on	law	in	a	global	context	rather	than	as	a	distinct	legal	field?16	Should	we	be	bothered	 with	 non	 ‘legal’	 actors	 claiming	 ‘rights’	 under	 informal	 norms	 and	 finance	processes	 or	 are	 they	 simply	 irrelevant?	 There	 is	 after	 all,	 a	 clear	 tension	 (perhaps	unnerving)	 between	 traditional	 state-centric	 ideas	 of	 law	 and	 approaches	 that	appreciate	the	growing	location	of	legal	rights	and	remedies	within,	beyond	and	sitting	in-between	 the	 boundary	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 market.	 This	 is	 of	 course,	 a	 personal	choice	 dependent	 on	 one’s	 own	 background	 and	 legal	 training	 and	 so	 it	 would	 be	impossible	to	give	an	answer	that	would	please	all.	Some	scholars	remain	convinced	of	a	purist	state	centred	approach	to	law	and	others	take	a	more	cross	border	approach	to	law.		Use	 of	 these	 types	 of	 policies	 has	 been	 long	 known,	 advised	 on	 and	 assisted	 by	practitioners’	 active	 in	 advising	 clients	 in	 cross-border	 transactions.17	 Whilst	 these	
                                       16	 Peer	 Zumbansen,	 Transnational	 Law,	 in:	 Encyclopaedia	 of	 Comparative	 Law	 (Jan	 Smits	 ed.,	 2nd	 ed.,	2012),	 898-935,	 at	 XX;	 for	 a	 similarly	 oriented	 analysis	 of	 transnational	 rules	with	 a	 focus	 on	 sources	rather	than	content,	see	already	Emmanuel	Gaillard,	Transnational	Law:	A	Legal	System	or	a	Method	of	Decision	Making?,17:1	Arbitration	International	59-71	(2001),	60-62.	17	 Starting	 in	 the	 1980s	 with	 the	 World	 Bank’s	 in-house	 policy	 on	 involuntary	 resettlement	 and	indigenous	 peoples,	 which	 were	 shaped	 into	 the	 Operational	 Directives	 of	 the	 1990s	 and	 revised	throughout	the	1990s	and	early	2000s.	The	wider	development	community	began	to	replicate	the	bank’s	
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types	 of	 policies	 do	 not	 constitute	 legally	 binding	 laws,	 the	 academy	 has	 called	 for	analysis	 of	 these	 types	 of	 policies	 as	 important	 bodies	 of	 normative	 practice	 and	international	market	standard	setting	guidelines.	This	 is	due	to	 their	 fast	proliferating	within	 international,	multilateral	 and	 bilateral	 institutions	with	 the	 ensuing	 potential	for	application	broadly	across	borders	and	within	many	geographically	diverse	projects	with	 vastly	 differing	 legal	 systems	 and	 socio-historic	 contexts.	 If	 applied	 in	 projects	these	 policies	 can	 directly	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 resettlement	 policies	 caused	 by	 project	displacement	or	as	sociologist	Sassen	calls	‘Expulsions18’)	or	indirectly	(as	in	the	case	of	policies	on	supply	chain	management	and	biodiversity)	impact	communities.	Moreover,	many	 of	 them	 come	 attached	 with	 their	 own	 non-judicial	 ombudsman	 grievance	mechanisms	through	which	communities	can	make	direct	complaints	towards	financial	institutions	on	the	socio-economic	impacts	of	projects	on	communities19	and	even	draw	attention	to	the	adverse	socio-economic	effects	of	the	finance	structures	through	which	the	policies	are	implemented.	For	example,	in	one	complaint	against	the	Bujugali	hydro-electric	 power	 plant,	 aggrieved	 local	 communities	 made	 direct	 reference	 in	 their	complaint	 to	 the	 high	margin	 on	 the	 loan	 agreements	 as	 an	 aggravating	 factor	 to	 the	proper	 and	 careful	 consideration	 of	 resettlement	 issues.	 Surely,	 this	 type	 of	 global	interconnectivity	caused	by	increased	financialization	and	globalisation	combined	with	a	lack	of	formal	and	robust	legal	protection	on	land	and	resettlement	in	many	countries	
                                       resettlement	 policies	 with	 the	 OECD	 producing	 guidelines	 on	 resettlement	 planning	 in	 1991,	 the	European	 Bank	 for	 Reconstruction	 and	Development	 producing	 its	 first	 environmental	 policy	 in	 1991,	indigenous	policy	 in	2008,	 the	Asian	Development	Bank	 formulating	a	 resettlement	policy	 in	1996	and	indigenous	policy	 in	1998,	 the	 Inter-American	Development	Bank	adopted	 resettlement	policy	 in	1998	and	an	indigenous	policy	in	2006	and	the	African	Development	Bank	formulating	a	resettlement	policy	in	2002	(although	it	has	refused	to	establish	a	stand-alone	indigenous	policy).	Resettlement	policies	trickled	into	 the	 private	 sector	 with	 the	 IFC	 as	 private	 arm	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 producing	 its	 own	 involuntary	resettlement	 policy	 in	 2002	 and	 indigenous	 policy	 in	 2006.	 The	 following	 year,	 the	 Equator	 Principles	were	approved	by	90	financial	institutions	across	37	countries	covering	over	70%	of	project	finance	debt	worldwide,	 to	 form	 a	 corpus	 of	 globally	 valid	 norms	 for	 banks	 involved	 in	 project	 finance	 concerning	regarding	matters	 such	 as	 the	 rights	 of	 project	 affected	 people	 and	 indigenous	 people.	 	 See	 generally	Cernea	M,	 'The	 ‘Ripple	Effect’	 in	Social	Policy	and	 its	Political	Content:	A	Debate	on	Social	Standards	 in	Public	 and	 Private	 Development	 Projects',	 in	 Likosky	 M,	 Privatising	 Development:	 Transnational	 Law,	
Infrastructure	and	Human	Rights	 (M.	Nijhoff	Publishers	2005)	 for	a	history	on	 involuntary	resettlement	policies	 within	 international	 financial	 institutions.	 Safeguard	 policies	 cover	 a	 range	 of	 ‘public	 interest’	topics	 including	 environmental	 assessments,	 cultural	 diversity,	 biodiversity,	 supply	 chain	 issues,	involuntary	resettlement	and	Indigenous	peoples	18	 	 Saskia	Sassen,	Expulsions:	Brutality	and	Complexity	 in	 the	Global	Economy	 (Harvard	University	Press	2014).	19	These	mechanisms	were	created	to	provide	a	degree	of	independent	scrutiny	and	public	accountability	for	compliance	of	its	policies:	for	an	overview	of	the	inspection	panel	and	its	historical	development	see	Alfredsson	G	and	Ring	R,	The	Inspection	Panel	of	the	World	Bank	:	a	different	complaints	procedure	(Raoul	Wallenberg	Institute	human	rights	library,	Martinus	Nijoff	Publishers	2000).	
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makes	these	types	of	policies	of	concern	to	public	international	lawyers.				Through	the	OT	Project	study,	I	suggest	that	globalised	and	financialised	contexts	of	the	law	 should	 also	 be	 of	 concern	 to	 the	 academy	 given	 their	 ability	 to	 practically	 effect	subjects	of	international	law:	individuals	and	groups.	After	all,	the	notion	of	indigenous	status	claimed	by	herders	follows	the	understanding	in	international	law	as	applying	to	persons	 claiming	 a	 special	 socio-economic,	 cultural	 and	 communal	 relationship	 to	traditional	 land:	 a	 position	 which	 legal	 case	 law	 and	 authority	 has	 given	 affirmative	recognition.	For	herders,	diversion	of	the	river	violated	the	human	rights	guaranteed	by	Mongolian	 and	 international	 legislation,	 specifically:	 water	 rights,	 pasture	 rights,	livelihood	rights	and	historical	and	cultural	heritage	protection	rights.20	Herders	claim,	as	 traditional	 Indigenous	 legitimate	 owners,	 a	 fundamental	 ownership	 right	 to	 their	traditional	 pastureland,	 collateral	 rights	 to	 livelihood,	 culture,	 pasture	 or	 food	 and	water	and	even	fundamental	constitutional	rights	on	land	relating	to	prior	consultation,	participation	in	decision	making	and	adequate	financial	compensation.		They	share	the	Indigenous	 commonality	 of	 having	 a	 special	 relationship	 to	 traditional	 land,	 but	 for	diverse	reasons	discussed	 later	such	as	no	state	recognition	as	 indigenous,	are	denied	formal	recognition	as	indigenous	under	Mongolian	law.				The	 contention	 is	 that	 mining	 operations	 have	 fractured	 their	 distinctive	 nomadic	identity	and	access	to	grazing	land	and	water	vital	to	livelihoods.	Herders	thus	wish	to	obtain	meaningful	compensation	 for	 the	 loss	of	 traditional	 rights	 to	 land	and	 to	enjoy	rights	to	 free,	prior	and	 informed	consent21	before	 further	 land	activities	occur.	These	are	 I	 am	sure,	 rights	 that	all	 indigenous	and	 land	 rights	 scholars	whether	 schooled	 in	domestic,	international	or	global	legal	perspectives	can	‘get	behind’.	What	we	find	in	the	OT	Project	are	simply	new	 types	of	actors,	norms	and	processes	 through	which	 these	rights	 are	 concretised,	 shaped	 and	 channelled.	 What	 the	 following	 does	 is	 draw	attention	 to	 these	 new	 frontiers	 as	 part	 of	 a	 much	 larger	 pattern	 of	 ‘real	 world’	developments	 connected	 to	 the	 changing	 role	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 emergence	 and	implications	of	new	actors,	norms	and	processes	in	global	legal	contexts	of	privatisation	
                                       20	 Excerpts	 taken	 from	 Second	 Complaint	 of	 herder	 groups	 resettled	 in	 the	 Oyu	 Tolgoi	 Project	 dated	February	11	2013.	21	The	right	of	Indigenous	people	to	FPIC	in	relation	to	developments	on	their	land	is	a	growing	standard	in	international	law	with	its	clearest	elaboration	contained	in	articles	19	and	32(2)	of	the	UNDRIP.	
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and	 natural	 resource	 governance	 of	 relevance	 to	 this	 project	 and	 potentially	 many	others	involving	financial	investors.			Having	 shone	 light	 on	 the	 connection	 between	weak	 domestic	 laws	 and	 the	 effect	 of	unstable	 domestic	 protection	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 private	 investors	 to	 plug	 the	 gap	with	informal	 norms	 implemented	 through	 complex	 financial	 mechanisms	 like	 project	finance	 and	private	 grievance	mechanisms	 in	which	 affected	 communities	 can	 ‘speak’	directly	 to	 these	 informal	norms	and	processes	and	how	they	have	adversely	affected	their	rights	and	livelihoods.	Having	thus	made	the	case	for	the	sincere	consideration	of	informal	norms,	financial	processes	and	non-legally	recognised	‘actors’	in	contemporary	discussions	on	 law	making	 in	a	global	context,	 the	rest	of	 the	paper	explores	 the	 ‘real	life’	 impacts	of	 these	 ‘extra-legal’	actors,	norms	and	processes	on	herder	communities	and	the	rule	of	law.			
3. The	Role	 of	 the	 IFC	 and	 EBRD	 in	 the	OT	Project	 and	 the	 Entry	 of	 Project	
Finance	‘Financialization’	Processes		
	Weak	 domestic	 laws	 and	 the	 increasing	 involvement	 of	 financial	 investors	 in	demarcation	of	the	land	rights	and	identity	of	displaced	herders	also	has	implications	in	the	types	of	 ‘networks’	that	herders	are	forced	to	negotiate,	adjudicate	and	make	their	voices	heard.	In	the	presence	of	a	strong	legal	system,	we	would	expect	this	‘network’	to	consist	of	formal	legal	adjudication	networks	and	due	process	procedures.	What	we	find	in	the	OT	Project	are	communities	making	claims	through	‘financial’	networks	and	non-legal	grievance	processes.	This	inevitably	draws	into	question	the	‘insulating’	nature	of	project	finance	networks	and	how	it	might	affect	how	private	investors	view	issues	like	those	 relating	 to	 indigenous	 identity	 and	 economic	 trade	 off	 discussed	 later	 in	 this	paper.	The	natural	ideology	in	project	financing	networks	is	for	all	risk	to	be	kept	away	from	the	project:	pushed	at	‘arm’s	length’.	The	layered	and	risk	averse	nature	of	project	finance	has	obvious	implications	for	overall	access	to	justice	for	communities	that	find	legal	and	physical	recourse	to	project	sponsors	or	developers	particularly	challenging.			Through	 a	 limited	 liability	 special	 purpose	 vehicle,	 the	 OT	 Project	 is	 structured	 to	
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insulate	it	from	political,	social,	market	and	environmental	risks,	pushing	them	further	away	 from	 the	 project.	 Indeed	 the	 ‘success’	 of	 a	 project	 is	 not	 only	 vulnerable	 to	disturbances	 in	 private	 markets	 but	 is	 highly	 sensitive	 to	 ‘public	 outcries	 because	 it	bears	directly	on	social	and	environmental	issues.22		Powerful	 shareholders	 and	 developers	 sit	 ‘behind’	 the	 special	 purpose	 ‘project	company’.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 OT	 project	 company	 is	 a	 ‘shell’	 company	 owned	 by	subsidiaries	of	Rio	Tinto	and	the	GoM.		The	‘layered’	nature	of	project	finance	works	to	obfuscate	 legal	 relations	 such	 that	 affected	 communities	 remain	 unaware	 of	 the	ultimate	identity	of	the	developers	and	how	they	might	speak	to	the	private	entities	that	are	 ultimately	 responsible	 for	 restricting	 their	 ability	 to	 access	 land.	 One	 possible	solution	 would	 be	 to	 make	 all	 developers	 disclose	 ownership	 structures	 and	 project	party	identities	to	host	governments	and	local	communities.			Pursuant	to	this	layered	structure,	contracts	for	construction	and	operation	are	formed	between	 the	 project	 company	 and	 third	 parties	 with	 strict	 limitation	 of	 liability	provisions	 designed	 to	 ‘shield’	 the	 project	 company	 from	 excessive	 liability	 and	ultimately	bankruptcy:	ensuring	limited	recourse	to	the	company.		This	is	important	as	the	 project	 investors	 are	 paid	 entirely	 out	 of	 the	 project	 revenues.	 This	 makes	 the	period	up	to	project	construction	a	high	risk	‘red	light’	period	for	investors.	Ironically,	it	is	also	the	period	in	which	resettlement	activities	will	occur	leading	to	a	severe	conflict	of	 interest	 for	 financial	 investors	 and	 the	 GoM,	 who	 of	 course	 have	 human	 rights	obligations	towards	their	citizens.			The	 financial	 viability	 of	 the	 financial	 structure	 is	 based	 on	 an	 approach	 to	 problem	solving	devoted	to	maintaining	a	certain	 level	of	 liquidity	within	the	project	 to	ensure	debt	 repayment.	 Consequently,	 a	 financially	 driven	 approach	 to	 problem	 solving	 if	things	go	wrong	is	 factored	into	the	project	through	an	obsessive	pre-occupation	with	due	diligence,	timing	and	risk	mitigation.	Ensuring	the	timely	construction	of	the	project	and	its	proper	operation	is	crucial	for	lenders	as	it	is	fundamental	to	the	success	of	the	project	and	debt	repayment.	Specific	sub-contracts	relating	to	construction	for	example,	
                                       22	Shamir	R,	'Corporate	Social	Responsibility:	Towards	a	New	Market-Embedded	Morality?'	(2008)	9	(2)	Theoretical	Inquiries	in	Law	371,	384.	
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are	made	between	the	project	company	and	a	construction	contractor.	They	are	made	subject	 to	 tight	 completion	 deadlines	 and	 limited	 liability	 provisions	 to	 protect	 the	liquidity	 of	 the	 company.	 	 Construction	 contracts	 often	 contain	 liquidated	 damages	provisions	which	work	to	compensate	the	project	company	in	the	event	of	construction	default,	 delays	 and	 the	 resulting	 inability	 to	 repay	 project	 debt	 to	 financiers	 per	repayment	terms.	These	mechanisms	work	to	incentivise	the	construction	contractor	to	construct	 on	 time	 thus	 leaving	 little	 or	 no	 time	 to	 factor	 in	 engagement	 with	communities	 who	 are	 claiming	 traditional	 connection	 to	 land.	 One	 possible	 solution	would	 be	 to	 include	 an	 independently	 verified	 assessment	 within	 the	 Borrower’s	project	 construction	 completion	 certificate	 that	 affected	 land	 connected	 persons	 have	been	identified.		If	resettlement	activities	were	to	be	conducted	the	project	company	would	sub-contract	any	 resettlement	 implementation	 to	 a	 limited	 liability	 subsidiary	 to	physically,	 legally	and	economically	distance	itself	from	those	activities	and	their	potential	failures.	Given	this	‘insulating’	and	‘distancing’	ideology	behind	project	finance,	it	is	not	difficult	to	see	the	temptation	for	project	investors	to	get	involved	in	identity	issues	and	label	herders	‘vulnerable’	 as	 opposed	 to	 ‘indigenous’,	 as	 discussed	 later	 in	 this	 paper.	 This	 is	especially	the	case	where	there	is	no	domestic	law	clarifying	the	issue.	Similarly,	given	the	 ‘policy	 space’	 given	 to	 organisations	 under	 their	mandates	 to	 cherry	 pick	 human	rights	and	themselves	determine	which	rights	are	to	be	respected	and	how,	it	is	easy	to	see	 how	 complicated	 and	 time-consuming	 matters	 of	 land	 and	 indigenous	 peoples’	rights	will	voluntarily	enter	into	project	design.			A	2015	report	 for	 the	African	Development	Bank	 (AFDB)23	picks	up	on	several	 issues	within	its	own	2003	Involuntary	Resettlement	Policy.	Each	of	these	points	demonstrate	the	ideological	clash	and	difficulties	that	the	AFDB	and	comparable	institutions	such	as	the	IFC	and	EBRD	have	in	incorporating	these	fundamentally	conflicted	social	concerns	into	the	economic	ethos	of	their	development	operations,	well	typified	in	the	complete	failure	of	a	‘social	rate	of	return’	indicators	into	project	operations.24	The	policy	report	
                                       23	Safeguards	and	Sustainability	Series,	Volume	1,	 Issue	3:	Review	of	 the	 implementation	of	 the	African	Development	Bank’s	2003	Involuntary	Resettlement	Policy,	2015).	24	Likosky	M,	Privatising	Development	 :	Transnational	Law,	 Infrastructure	and	Human	Rights	 (M.	Nijhoff	Publishers	2005)	containing	observations	of	chief	bank	social	adviser	Cernea	on	how	many	economists	
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discussed	 the	 following	specific	barriers	as	 compromising	 the	 implementation	of	 land	rights	in	development	projects.	 	Barriers	include	poor	internal	monitoring	caused	by	a	lack	of	 incentives	within	 the	bank	 in	monitoring	 the	social	aspects	of	 the	project	with	preference	given	 to	 the	monitoring	of	 the	project’s	physical	progress	and	 institutional	fear	over	 time	delay	 and	expense	 in	preparing	 and	 submitting	 resettlement	plans.	An	earlier	 legal	 ethnography	 study	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 identifies	 how	 some	 departments	have	more	 ‘power’	 than	others25:	bad	news	 for	 those	 in	 the	environmental	 and	 social	teams	and	good	news	for	those	staffed	in	project	operation	and	closure.	The	larger	take	away	 from	 this	 is	 acknowledgment	 that	 the	 entire	 financial	 network	 through	 which	policies	 are	 implemented	 and	 communities	 are	 required	 to	 negotiate	 their	 claims	 is	fundamentally	designed	to	push	socio-economic	and	cultural	risks	out	of	the	project	and	safeguard	timely	project	completion.			I	 argue	 that	 this	 financial	 ideology	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	 institutional	 trends	discussed	in	the	rest	of	this	paper	that	have	been	able	to	gain	traction	as	‘rights’	due	to	the	weakness	of	Mongolian	law.			Private	investors	like	the	IFC	and	EBRD	have	developed	policies	evidencing	a	legal	right	to	 land	 for	 Indigenous	 (PS	7)	 and	 resettled	persons	 (PS	5).	These	 apply	where	 either	physical	or	economic	displacement	are	unavoidable	because	of	a	development	project	in	which	 they	 are	 investing.	 The	 objective	 of	 the	 resettlement	 policy	 is	 to	 actively	incorporate	 affected	 communities	 into	 projects,	 make	 positive	 contributions	 to	development26	 or,	 at	 a	 minimum,	 to	 do	 no	 harm	 to	 local	 communities.	 Land	 related	rights	for	displaced	non-Indigenous	persons27	include	compensation	for	loss	of	assets	at	
                                       within	the	bank	had	tried	to	introduce	the	concept	of	a	social	rate	of	return	into	project	governance	but	arguments	against	it	were	strong	focusing	on	methodological	and	implementation	difficulty.		25	Trubek	D,	Santos	A,	The	New	Law	and	Economic	Development:	A	Critical	Appraisal	(CUP	2006).	26	 EBRD	 Performance	 Requirement	 5	 2014	 on	 land	 and	 involuntary	 resettlement.	 Its	 objective	 is	 to	mitigate	adverse	social	and	economic	impacts	from	land	acquisition	and	to	restore,	and	where	possible,	potentially	 improve,	 their	 standards	 of	 living	 and/or	 livelihoods	 and	 IFC	 Performance	 Standards	 2012	with	a	 similar	provision	 requiring	 that	 in	addition	 to	 compensation	 for	 lost	assets,	 if	 any,	 economically	displaced	 persons	 whose	 livelihoods	 or	 income	 levels	 are	 adversely	 affected	 will	 also	 be	 provided	opportunities	 to	 improve,	or	at	 least	restore,	 their	means	of	 income-earning	capacity,	production	 levels	and	standards	of	living.	27	IFC	PS	5	states	that	displaced	persons	may	be	classified	as	persons	(i)	who	have	formal	legal	rights	to	the	land	or	assets	they	occupy	or	use;	(ii)	who	do	not	have	formal	legal	rights	to	land	or	assets,	but	have	a	claim	to	land	that	is	recognized	or	recognizable	under	national	law;	19	or	(iii)	who	have	no	recognizable	legal	right	or	claim	to	the	land	or	assets	they	occupy	or	use.	
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full	replacement	cost	and	other	assistance	to	help	them	improve	or	at	least	restore	their	standards	 of	 living	 or	 livelihoods.28	 Other	 land	 related	 rights	 for	 non-Indigenous	displaced	 groups	 include	 community	 engagement,29	 and	 the	 preparation	 of	 a	resettlement	action	plan	to	mitigate	against	the	adverse	impacts	of	resettlement.30		For	Indigenous	 persons,	 IFC	 PS	 7	 on	 Indigenous	 people,	 largely	 like	 that	 of	 the	 EBRD,	expands	 consideration	 of	 Indigenous	 peoples’	 specific	 circumstances	 in	 developing	mitigation	 measures	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	 land	 subject	 to	 traditional	 ownership	 or	under	 customary	 use.	 Other	 rights	 include	 the	 fair	 and	 equitable	 sharing	 of	 benefits	associated	with	 the	 use	 of	 resources	 central	 to	 the	 identity	 and	 livelihood	 of	 affected	groups.31	 Crucially,	 the	 policy	 emphasises	 the	 need	 for	 free,	 prior	 and	 informed	consent32	 in	 international	 policy,	 also	 an	 idea	 gaining	 currency	 in	 legal	 circles.	 The	policy	builds	on	this	type	of	open,	informed	and	free	dialogue	by,	for	example,	providing	groups	 with	 the	 special	 right	 to	 be	 involved	 and	 consulted	 within	 project	 decision	making.				In	practice	however,	the	default	position	under	land	resettlement	policies	is	that	neither	displaced	nor	Indigenous	groups	have	the	right	to	refuse	land	acquisition	or	restrictions	on	land	use	that	result	in	physical	or	economic	displacement.		The	project’s	right	of	way	is	 prioritised	 and	 resettlement	 in	 both	 traditional	 and	 non-traditional	 contexts	 is	considered	 involuntary:	 a	 position	 evidenced	 by	 the	 name	 of	 both	 land	 policies	 as	relating	 to	 ‘involuntary	 resettlement’.	 Both	 the	 IFC	 and	 EBRD’s	 operational	 policies	explicitly	 refer	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 ‘human	 rights’	 within	 project	 operations.33	Remarkably,	 the	 EBRD	 expressly	 connects	 the	 application	 of	 PS	 5	with	 the	 universal	respect	for,	and	observance	of,	human	rights	and	freedoms	and	specifically	the	right	to	adequate	housing	and	the	continuous	improvement	of	living	conditions	contained	in	the	UDHR	and	the	ICESCR.34	Running	parallel	to	the	policy	narratives	on	doing	no	harm	and	
                                       28	See	IFC	Performance	Standard	5	on	Land	Acquisition	and	Involuntary	Resettlement,	para	9.	29	Ibid,	para	10.	30	Ibid	para	12.	31	Ibid.	32	 Interestingly	 the	 comparable	World	 Bank	 standards	 to	 Indigenous	 persons:	 Operational	 Policy	 4.12,	uses	 the	 less	 stringent	 version	 of	 ‘free,	 prior	 and	 informed	 consultation’	 leading	 to	 broad	 community	support’	 demonstrating	 a	 fragmentation	 and	 inconsistency	 within	 the	 policies	 and	 international	 law-making.	33	 In	 Performance	 Standard	 1	 of	 the	 IFC	 policy,	 para	 4	 states	 that	 several	 cross	 cutting	 topics	 such	 as	climate	change,	gender,	human	rights	and	water	are	addressed	across	multiple	performance	standards.	34	EBRD	PR	5	para	3.	
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positive	 development	 outcomes	 runs	 the	 established	 policy	 that	 the	 political	prohibitions	 within	 their	 articles	 of	 association	 mean	 that	 development	 finance	institutions	 like	 the	World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IFC	 have	 not	 agreed	 to	 directly	 incorporate	human	rights	into	the	policies.35		Contradictions	abound	and	it	 is	perhaps	the	institutional	temperament	of	the	financial	investor	rather	than	any	policy	guideline	that	is	the	most	decisive	consideration	in	the	practical	 implementation	 of	 policy.	 Informal	 discussants36	 noted	 how	 management	remains	 aware	 of	 this	 ambiguity	 between	 promoting	 policies	 speaking	 to	 the	 full	spectrum	of	human	rights:	 civil,	political,	 collective,	 cultural	and	green	rights,	 and	 the	practical	reality	that	only	civil	and	political	rights	directly	relevant	to	the	development	of	market	economies	will	be	actively	promoted.		Discussions	with	bank	staff	reveal	how	application	 of	 policies	 are	 ‘scoped’	 around	 institutional	 mandates.	 For	 example,	decisions	over	policy	operationalisation	are	typically	based	on	an	economic	method	of	implementation	 called	 the	 new	public	management	which	 sees	 the	 export	 of	 rational	market	 thinking	 and	 measurable	 (‘tick	 the	 box’)	 performance	 indicators	 for	 public	policy	issues37.	As	one	interviewee	stated:	decisions	to	enter	discussions	over	whether	to	make	 positive	 development	 contributions	 or	 simply	 do	 no	 harm	will	 have	 a	 direct	correlation	with	the	amount	the	institution	is	investing	in	the	project	and	its	amount	in	relation	to	other	lenders	as	a	means	of	leveraging	influence.			This	 socio-economic	 trade-off	 is	present	within	 IFC	Standards	stating	 that	 the	 level	of	IFC’s	engagement	is	determined	by	the	nature	and	scope	of	the	proposed	investment	or	advisory	 activity,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 specific	 circumstances	 of	 the	 collaboration	 and	relationship	with	 the	 client.38	This	 sentiment	was	echoed	within	discussions	 in	which	commitment	to	public	policy	issues	were	said	to	be	dependent	on	project	economics39	
                                       35	 Reference	 is	 made	 to	 World	 Bank	 webinar	 in	 which	 the	 author	 participated	 on	 ‘The	 Evolution	 of	Safeguards:	The	Proposed	Environmental	and	Social	Framework’.	World	Bank	participants	comprised	of	Stefan	 Koeberle	 (Director	 of	 Operations	 Risk	Management),	 Agi	 Kiss	 (Regional	 Safeguards	 Advisor	 for	Europe	and	Central	Asia),	Una	Meades	(World	Bank	Senior	Legal	Counsel)	and	Glenn	Morgan	(Safeguards	Advisor):	on	file	with	the	author.	36	Reference	is	made	to	informal	conversations	with	senior	members	of	an	IO’s	environmental	and	social	safeguards	team	that	remain	confidential	and	on	file	with	the	author.	37	Hood	C,	 ‘The	 “New	Public	Management”	 in	 the	1980s:	Variations	on	a	Theme'	 (1995)	20	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	93,	97.	38	See	paragraph	19	of	the	2012	IFC	Environmental	and	Social	Performance	Standards.	39	Supra	35.	
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and	even	the	type	of	development	project	undertaken,	with	the	understanding	that	road	projects	are	more	development	friendly	as	communities	can	use	roads	with	mines	being	‘dirtier’	and	thus	requiring	a	higher	level	of	social	engagement.			The	 following	section	will	discuss	 the	growing	 trend	of	 financial	 investors	 to	 factually	demarcate	in	‘who’	is	indigenous	in	the	light	of	poor	legal	protection	for	land	connected	groups	in	Mongolia.	Performance	Standard	7	makes	Indigenous	determination	a	matter	for	the	IFC	or	EBRD’s	private	client	who	may	seek	input	from	competent	professionals	40.	 The	 World	 Bank,	 IFC	 and	 EBRD	 recognise	 that	 there	 is	 no	 universally	 accepted	definition	 of	 Indigenous	 peoples41	 and	 take	 this	 legal	 ambiguity	 to	 present	 their	 own	definitions.	 In	 determining	 Indigenous	 status,	 the	 World	 Bank	 follows	 the	 lead	 of	international	law	when	applying	its	policy	on	Indigenous	people42.	However,	clarifying	the	 legal	position	is,	as	 investors	note43,	a	complex	process	given	the	sheer	number	of	definitions	 of	 Indigenous	 under	 international	 law	 and	 the	 differences	 within	 these	definitional	 approaches	 leaves	 the	 scope	 for	 deciding	 which	 groups	 are	 Indigenous	fragmented,	inconsistent	and	arguably,	open	to	manipulation.			Common	to	the	IFC44	and	EBRD45	is	the	use	of	the	term	in	a	generic	sense	to	refer	to	a	distinct	 social	 and	 cultural	 group	 possessing	 the	 following	 characteristics	 in	 varying	degrees	 including	 self-identification,	 collective	 attachment	 to	 geographically	 distinct	habitats	 and	 distinct	 language.	 The	 EBRD	 also	 classifies	 as	 Indigenous,	 people	 with	descent	 from	 populations	 who	 have	 traditionally	 pursued	 non-wage	 (and	 often	nomadic/transhumant46)	 subsistence	 strategies	 and	 whose	 status	 was	 regulated	 by	their	own	customs	or	traditions.			Studies	on	Indigenous	rights	in	the	context	of	World	Bank	policy	conclude	that	in	states	where	Indigenous	groups	are	politically	organised	and	familiar	with	World	Bank	policy,	
                                       40	IFC	Performance	Standard	7,	para	8	stating	that	the	client	will	identify,	through	an	environmental	and	social	 risks	 and	 impacts	 assessment	 process,	 all	 communities	 of	 Indigenous	Peoples	within	 the	project	area	of	 influence	who	may	be	affected	by	 the	project,	 as	well	 as	 the	nature	and	degree	of	 the	expected	direct	and	indirect	economic,	social,	cultural.	41	Supra,	34.		42	Supra	34.	43	Supra	35.	44	IFC	Performance	Standard	7,	para	5.	45	EBRD	Performance	Requirements	7,	para	3.	46	Ibid	para	4.	
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international	organisations	are	almost	 inevitably	drawn	into	processes	of	social	group	self-identification	 and	 definition.47	 In	 another	 study	 of	 World	 Bank	 practices	 in	Morocco,	 Sarfaty	 finds	 that	 bank	 managers	 decided	 not	 to	 recognise	 Berbers	 as	indigenous	notwithstanding	self-identification.	The	reason	for	this	was	an	alignment	of	policy	practice	with	the	state’s	non-recognition	of	ethnic	minorities	within	their	borders	as	 Indigenous.48	 Similarly,	 in	 other	 development	 projects,	 international	 organisations	have	 justified	 the	 non-application	 of	 indigenous	 policy	 based	 on	 lack	 of	 national	recognition	 notwithstanding	 factual	 claims	 made	 by	 local	 communities	 in	 Africa	 and	India	claiming	Indigenous	status.49		The	 OT	 Project	 provides	 a	 further	 case	 in	 point.	 Performance	 standards	 5	 on	involuntary	 resettlement	were	 triggered	 by	 both	 the	 IFC	 and	 EBRD.	 Notwithstanding	the	EBRD’s	express	policy	position	classifying	as	Indigenous,	people	with	descent	from	populations	 who	 have	 traditionally	 pursued	 non-wage	 (and	 often	nomadic/transhumant)	 subsistence	 strategies,	 the	 internal	 decision	was	made	 not	 to	apply	 the	 performance	 requirement	 7	 on	 IPs.	 This	 conflict	 meant	 that	 financial	institutions	 were,	 through	 grievance	 complaints	 lodged	 by	 herder	 households50,	brought	directly	into	discussions	on	the	herders’	claim	of	indigenous	status	and	special	connection	to	land,	which	investors,	with	state	backing,	continue	to	resist.		Drawing	on	informal	conversation	with	senior	interlocutors,	it	emerges	that	the	practice	of	applying	the	 Indigenous	 definition	 remains	 uncertain.	 Both	PS	 7	 policies	 contain	 the	 provision	that	IPs	do	not	lose	their	status	because	of	dispossession	or	might	live	in	mixed	or	urban	communities	 visiting	 their	 land	 on	 a	 seasonal	 basis.	 Yet,	 interlocutors	 expressed	 the	view	that	the	use	of	mobile	phones	by	Indigenous	people	erodes	Indigenous	status.			What	 we	 might	 deduce	 from	 these	 examples	 is	 a	 developing	 bank	 of	 precedents	 in	
                                       47	See	I	Brownlie	GS	Goodwin-Gill	&	S	Talmon,	The	Reality	of	 International	Law:	Essays	 in	Honour	of	 Ian	
Brownlie	(Clarendon	1999)	328;	B	Kingsbury,	'Indigenous	Peoples’	in	International	Law:	A	Constructivist	Approach	to	the	Asian	Controversy'	(1998)	92	AJIL	414.		48	Sarfaty	GA,	'The	World	Bank	and	the	Internalization	of	Indigenous	Rights	Norms'	(2005)	114	The	Yale	Law	Journal	1791.	49	 See	 the	 Bujugali	 hydroelectric	 project	 in	 Uganda,	 the	 Second	 Water	 Supply	 and	 Environmental	Sanitation	Project	in	Karnataka	approved	in	2001	affecting	the	Lambanis	and	Siddis,	ethnic	groups	with	distinctive	cultural	practices	who	could	arguably	qualify	as	Indigenous	peoples	under	Bank	policy	and	on	Asia,	see	more	broadly	Kingsbury	B,	'Indigenous	Peoples’	in	International	Law:	A	Constructivist	Approach	to	the	Asian	Controversy'	(1998)	92	AJIL	414.	50	 CAO	 Assessment	 Report,	 Second	 Complaint	 (Oyu	 Tolgoi-02)	 Regarding	 the	 Oyu	 Tolgoi	 Project	 (IFC	#29007	and	MIGA	#7041).	
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which	 private	 investors	 have	 created	 a	 policy	 space	 in	 which	 to	 make	 decisions	 on	factual	 identity	 demarcation.	 In	many	 cases	 land	 connected	 communities	 are	 already	subject	 to	 legal	recognition	blocks	at	 the	state	 level.	Financialization	and	globalisation	processes	 through	 which	 now	 private	 investors	 also	 have	 a	 say	 in	 identity	 have	 the	potential	to	further	compound	access	to	justice	for	land	connected	groups.		The	EBRD’s	potential	 future	 investments	within	Middle	 Eastern	 countries	 such	 as	 Jordan51	which	have,	 like	 Morocco,	 communities	 self-identifying	 as	 nomadic	 and	 into	 which	 future	investments	 are	 planned,	 will	 potentially	 provide	 further	 examples	 of	 investor	determination.	 This	 pattern	 of	 what	 we	 might	 call	 ‘investor-state	 sovereighty’	 over	factual	 indigenous	 demarcation	 constitutes	 major	 transnational	 dilemmas	 for	indigenous	struggles	directly	born	out	of	growing	financialization	and	globalisation.			Research	 has	 also	 discovered	 a	 recent	 trend	 amongst	 institutions,	 confirmed	 in	interviews	away	from	using	the	term	Indigenous	in	favour	of	 ‘vulnerable52’	persons	to	whom	 special	 measures	 such	 as	 compensation	 apply.	 The	 EBRD	 reserves53	 the	 term	vulnerable	groups	to	those	who,	by	gender,	ethnicity,	age,	physical	or	mental	disability,	economic	 disadvantage,	 or	 social	 status	 are	more	 adversely	 affected	 by	 displacement	than	others.54	The	institutional	choice	to	use	the	alternate	‘vulnerable’	label	over	that	of	‘Indigenous’	 is	 typically	 justified	 through	 political	 processes	 designed	 to	 protect	national	 sovereignty	 and	 avoid	 further	 legal	 fragmentation	 within	 international	 legal	definitions	discussed	above.55		Categorising	groups	as	 ‘vulnerable’	might	work	 to	capture	 the	economic	disadvantage	or	 social	 status	 experienced	 by	 groups	 in	 this	 case.	 However,	 this	 classification	 also	carries	significant	adverse	legal	ramifications	for	herders.	Arguably,	the	replacement	of	vulnerable	 for	 Indigenous	 erases	 the	 heart	 of	 Indigenous	 identity:	 the	 struggle	 for	recognition	of	their	special	attachment	to	traditional	land	and	related	to	this,	the	unique	
                                       51	 See	 the	 list	 of	 new	 wind,	 waste,	 solar	 and	 power	 projects	 project	 finance	 by	 the	 EBRD	 in	 Jordan:	available	 at:	 http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/project-finance/project-summary-documents.html?1=1&filterCountry=Jordan.	52	Interview	with	Senior	Land	Policy	Lead	at	a	development	organisation	and	to	supra	35.			53	Performance	standard	5,	para	12.	54	Ibid,	in	the	context	of	displacement	vulnerable	people,	include	those	living	below	the	poverty	line,	the	landless,	 the	 elderly,	 women-	 and	 children-headed	 households,	 ethnic	 minorities,	 natural	 resource	dependent	 communities	 or	 other	 displaced	 persons	 who	 may	 not	 be	 protected	 through	 national	 land	compensation	or	land	titling	legislation.			55	Supra	35.	
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type	of	discrimination	and	marginalisation	they	have	experienced	in	ongoing	processes	of	land	dispossession.	Consequently,	the	removal	of	the	Indigenous	label	in	favour	of	a	homogenous	 vulnerability	 label	 erodes	 the	 specificity	 of	 their	 struggle	 and	 erases	 the	building	blocks	upon	which	indigenous	groups	can	claim	legal	recognition	and	elevated	rights	of	 compensation	and	consultation	 such	as	 the	emerging	 right	of	 free,	prior	and	informed	consent.	The	above	evidence	of	institutional	dis-engagement	with	Indigenous	policy	has	the	effect	of	continuing	the	dispossession	of	land	connected	persons	through	policy	 praxis	 into	 an	 international	 space.	 Ultimately,	 the	 ‘politics’	 of	 sovereignty	 is	deployed	as	a	shield	through	which	to	protect	the	integrity	of	its	economic	mandate	and	dis-engage	with	social	settings	that	might	have	adverse	impacts	on	project	functionality	and	economics.				
4. Conclusion	
	This	paper	has	drawn	attention	to	the	role	of	new	actors,	norms	and	processes	in	global	governance.	Specifically,	it	shines	light	on	the	case	of	the	Oyu	Tolgoi	project	and	the	role	played	 by	 weak	 domestic	 laws	 on	 land	 and	 indigenous	 rights	 as	 crucial	 for	understanding	 the	 entry	 of	 new	 ‘legal’	 actors,	 ‘rights’	 and	 ‘remedies’	 into	 the	 legal	landscape	on	land	and	global	governance.	Drawing	on	the	specific	struggles	of	nomadic	pastoralist	 herders	 in	 Mongolia	 the	 paper	 shines	 light	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	 project	finance	 structures,	 informal	 land	 policies	 and	 factual	 determination	 of	 ‘indigenous’	identity	 shaped	 by	 financial	 institutions	 involved	 in	 the	 financing	 of	 the	 project.		Through	 this	 case	 study	 it	 hopes	 to	 draw	attention	 to	 a	 larger	 pattern	 of	 ‘real	world’	developments	connected	to	the	changing	role	of	the	state,	the	emergence	of	new	actors,	norms	and	processes	in	modern	processes	of	globalisation	and	financialization	and	the	effect	of	the	same	on	the	rights	of	affected	communities.			
 
